“You knew, and you could have acted.
Why didn’t you?” This is the question you do not want to be asked.
And increasingly, it’s the question leaders are forced to answer after an incident.
For years, many executive teams and boards have treated a large vulnerability backlog as an uncomfortable but tolerable fact of life: “we’ve accepted the risk.” If you’ve ever seen a report showing
“You knew, and you could have acted.
This is the question you do not want to be asked.
And increasingly, it’s the question leaders are forced to answer after an incident.
For years, many executive teams and boards have treated a large vulnerability backlog as an uncomfortable but tolerable fact of life: “we’ve accepted the risk.” If you’ve ever seen a report showing thousands (or tens of thousands) of open Highs and Critical CVEs, you’ve probably also heard the usual rationalizations from folks that would rather look the other way: we have other priorities , this will take years of engineering time to fix , how do you know these are really Critical, we’re still prioritizing, we’ll get to it.